

LQ dynamic games

as receding-horizon variational inequalities

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
December 9, 2025

CDC '25


Motivation



📄 Kalaria et al., 2025



📄 Le Cleac'h et al., 2022




📄 Fieni et al., 2025




📄 Baghbadorani et al., 2025

MPC in a nutshell




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
- Constrained, non-LQ case intractable
- Open-loop operation

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


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
MPC: Approximate via feedback




Game-theoretic MPC in a nutshell



Game-theoretic MPC in a nutshell



Game MPC



What we will cover

- How to design the finite-horizon OCPs to match the ∞ -horizon performance?
- How can we compute the solution in real-time?

Infinite-horizon optimality



Optimal control

$$x^{t+1} = Ax^t + Bu^t$$

$$J(u) = \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} xQx + uRu$$





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Optimal control:

$$u^* \in \arg \min_u J(u)$$





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Dynamic game

$$x^{t+1} = Ax^t + \sum_i B_i u_i^t$$

For each agent i :

$$J_i(u_i, u_{-i}) = \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} x^t Q_i x^t + u_i^t R_i u_i^t$$




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
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open-loop Nash eq:

$$u_i^* \in \arg \min_{u_i} J_i(u_i, u_{-i}^*), \text{ for all } i$$





Alg. Riccati equation



$$\begin{cases} P = Q + A^T P (A + BK) \\ K = -R^{-1} B^T P (A + BK) \end{cases}$$

$$u^* = Kx$$

Achieved objective:

$$J^* = x^T P x$$



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Coupled AREs

for each agent i :

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$$u_i^* = K_i x_i$$

📄 Monti et al., 2024



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Lemma:


can construct P_i from X_i, K_i :

$$J_i^* = \begin{bmatrix} x \\ x \end{bmatrix}^T P_i \begin{bmatrix} x \\ x \end{bmatrix}$$

Benenati and Grammatico, 2025


Why two states?

Agent i 's model of the problem at the ARE solution ($K_{1,\dots,N}$)




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
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∞ -horizon optimal MPC

$$u^* \in \arg \min_u \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} x^t Q x^t + u_i R u_i^t$$





∞ -horizon optimal MPC



$$u^* \in \arg \min_u x^N P x^N + \sum_{t=0}^N x^t Q x^t + u_i R u_i^t$$



∞ -horizon optimal MPC



∞ -horizon Nash MPC

$$u^* \in \arg \min_u x^N P x^N + \sum_{t=0}^N x^t Q x^t + u_i R u_i^t$$

Theorem

$$\underbrace{u^{*1}, \dots, u^{*N}}_{\text{horizon}}, \underbrace{K_X^N, K_X^{N+1} \dots}_{\text{"terminal controller"}}$$

is ∞ -horizon optimal.

Bei Hu and Linnemann, 2002



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∞ -horizon Nash MPC

Find u^* such that

$$u_i^* \in \arg \min_{u_i} \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} x^t Q_i x^t + u^t R_i u^t$$

$$x^{t+1} = A x^t + B_i u_i^t + \sum_{j \neq i} B_j u_j^{t*}$$



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📄 Benenati and Grammatico, 2025

LQ games as variational inequalities



MPC as QP



Substitute out the state, derive:

$$\nabla_u J = Hu + Fx^0$$



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Nec. and suff. for optimality:

KKT of a QP

$$0 = Hu + Fx^0 + C^T \lambda$$

$$0 \leq \lambda \perp -Cu - Dx^0 + c \geq 0$$



Game MPC as VI



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$$\begin{bmatrix} \nabla_{u_1} J_1 \\ \vdots \\ \nabla_{u_N} J_N \end{bmatrix} = H \begin{bmatrix} u_1 \\ \vdots \\ u_N \end{bmatrix} + Fx^0$$



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H not symmetric!

How to solve a VI

Iterative solvers

Operator splitting

 Mignoni et al., 2025 **moAVISO**

Newton step + line-search

 Zhu and Borrelli, 2024

Douglas-Rachford

 Baghbadorani et al., 2025

Interior point method

 Liu and Liao-McPherson, 2025

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
📄 Baghbadorani et al., 2025

Interior point method


📄 Liu and Liao-McPherson, 2025

Explicit solution mapping

- Solution is piecewise affine in x^0
- One region per combination of constraints
- **IDEA**: Compute offline
- **New!** 📄 arXiv:2512.07749




The Dynamic Nash Equilibrium Control Toolbox




Online solution time

Random LQ games, N agents = 6, $n_u = 4$, Horizon = 7



Intersection clearance



Conclusion

Take-home messages

- Infinite-horizon constrained LQ games can be solved as a finite-horizon VI for some initial conditions
- Asymptotic stability of game MPC
- The solution is PWA in the initial condition
- Explicit solution computable offline
- Real-time computation is a reality

Thank you!
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 TAC 2026 (accepted)



 arXiv 2025



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